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ABSTRACT 
A cooperative network is a group of nodes working together to transmit and receive data. 
Therefore, they are well known for having the ability to enhance signal strength as well as 
reducing error in data transmission. Here, they will be used for another application of enhancing 
security against spies or moles. A spy may attempt to obtain data while it is being transmitted 
provided that they have the key and encryption technique that is being used. An enhanced 
security can be achieved over a multiple node cooperative networks by breaking the encrypted 
data into smaller pieces and sending them through different nodes. Since, in security systems, the 
data being sent is a ciphertext, (i.e., text after encryption), the order of bits is critical due to the 
avalanche effect criterion implemented in most known encryption algorithms, which is based on 
the fact that if one bit is in error it will lead to catastrophic error (on the average 50% of the bits 
are in error) after decryption. In this work we apply a model that uses these techniques to provide 
a better security. Since wireless communication is an open media and easily accessible the 
security must be enhanced. We propose changing the order of the bits in the ciphertext and then 
breaking up the resulting scrambled ciphertext data into smaller pieces to further protect the 
information against any data interception. Therefore any data that may be intercepted shall only 
be a fraction of the original ciphertext data, which is not sufficient for decrypting the cipher data. 
All of the pieces of data can only be collected and reorganized into the original message at the 
authentic destination node. As a result, the security in enhanced against a spy or mole that may 
have the key being used for encryption as only a scrambled fragment of the sought-after data is 
intercepted. The security performance of the proposed model is evaluated by calculating the bit 
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error probability at the spy‟s location. The results obtained show that the proposed model 
enhances security against spies who intercept data in the wireless channel.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 – Motivation 
You and your trusted friends are in a crowded coffee shop having a conversation. You then 
begin to discuss a private matter, where there is nothing that could stop someone from 
eavesdropping in and knowing what is being discussed. This situation is hardly different from 
data transfer in the open wireless media, at the same time they could potentially record your 
conversation with ease. Perhaps this person is a spy or mole who has obtained passwords or keys 
to access secure information, such as encrypted data as it is being transmitted and collected to be 
read later. So how does one ensure that their public conversations will not be over heard and 
comprehend? Consider a situation just like the one in the coffee shop, except this time you and 
your friends are speaking ever changing languages that can only be understood within the group. 
Even if the conversation were to be over heard it would not be understood. Taking this idea of 
changing languages in friendly conversation and moving to encrypted information being 
transmitted between parties (i.e., information is divided into different sections), if a spy or mole 
were to obtain access, then they would not be able to decrypt all the data. 
With currently available encryption methods, someone possessing the key and the 
encryption technique can simply intercept the encrypted message and decipher it so that they 
may obtain the entire original message. However, if the message is broken into smaller pieces, 
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with each piece being sent down an individual pathway, then the potential “mole” would be 
unable to intercept the entire message.   
Cooperative networks are powerful networks because they have the ability to make noise 
and signal strength problems trivial with their multi-node design. With more nodes available in 
cooperative networks, it gives them the capability of handling many other applications and 
achieving better performance because of their diversity combination techniques that they use. 
Given the fact that cooperative networks are well developed in literature, we propose their use 
for achieving our aforementioned goal to enhance data security through the utilization of a 
combination of encryption and cooperation. 
The remaining of this thesis is outlined in the following subsection. 
1.2 – Outline 
Chapter 2 is a review of the general knowledge needed to understand the basic concepts 
and terms. Reviewing literature on what is done on this topic is difficult because many papers 
and articles focus on the issue of keeping intruders and attackers out of the communication link. 
Although, the works in cooperative networking and mobile ad hoc networks were impressive for 
security schemes that describe how to keep intruders out while handling many types of attacks, 
this still does not solve the problem of keeping a mole from obtaining data once inside the 
system. In this chapter we did our best to report all related work in this area.  
In Chapter 3 we propose a cooperative-based system model to handle the threat of a 
potential spy. The reader may find this both interesting and challenging in order to make it a 
secure and feasible system to implement and handle the problem well. Within this system model, 
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we present the signal and channel model, why this model is vulnerable, and the breakup methods 
for sending secure data. We will also discuss the security advantage of the proposed model. 
 Chapter 4 then follows with a presentation of the algorithms and simulation results for 
evaluating the performance of our proposed security model, which if implemented in reality can 
greatly enhance the security of data.  
Finally we close in Chapter 5 wherein we draw some concluding remarks and discussions 
on how this work effectively enhances security. We also bring up a few more points for future 
work on this topic. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 – Introduction 
 In this chapter we discuss the hazards of spies obtaining important information while it is 
being transmitted. Also we provide a general background on cooperative networks and mobile ad 
hoc networks, which are ways by which data is communicated. In addition, we follow up with a 
review of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which is a well-known encryption 
algorithm, and then present an overview of security levels and classifications. We end this 
chapter by discussing the current state of art methods for wireless security. 
2.2 – The Spy Threat 
A spy or mole‟s job is to gain a user‟s trust which allows them to obtain important and 
critical information, such as an encryption technique, a key used for encryption, or a process for 
how important information is moved from location to location. The most vulnerable way to 
obtain this information is to intercept and copy it while it‟s being moved. In the case of wireless 
transmission this interception is done by simply listening to a data transmission and copying 
what is obtained. Wireless communication occurs in free space and is an open media; therefore it 
is easily obtainable just as if someone were to eavesdrop on a conversation. Usually, with most 
encryption techniques, it is nearly impossible to break the ciphertext without knowing the key. 
However, if the key is known, then the encryption becomes useless, allowing full 
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access to the encrypted information. This vulnerability can be fixed by applying a cooperative or 
multi-node network for data transmission and also by breaking and scrambling the data into 
smaller pieces for transmission. 
2.3 – Cooperative Networks 
Cooperative networks are a nexus of many nodes working together in order to send data 
with little or no error at the destination point. By sending the same data over all available links, a 
combining technique is used at the destination receiving a better signal than any single link could 
provide [1]. These networks are still in the process of being implemented into real world 
applications [2-3].   
Diversity combination is a technique applied to combine multiple received signals into a 
single improved signal to name a few; maximal-ratio combining (MRC) and equal gain 
combining (EGC) technique. MRC works by adding the signal on each link together. Then the 
gain of each link is made proportional to the root mean squared signal level and inversely 
proportional to the mean squared noise level in that link. Once this is completed, different 
proportionality constants are used for each link. Although EGC is simpler than MRC, each signal 
branch is weighted with the same factor, irrespective of the signal amplitude. Both MRC and 
EGC are types of cooperative networks [4-5]. 
2.4 – Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
Mobile ad hoc networks are known to reliably transmit any information from one point to 
another, even if the distance between two points is very far and outside the senders range. Each 
point is free moving and will always be changing its connection with other points. Since the 
network is always changing, any point will have to forward or re-route information that is not 
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important or related to itself. With this in mind, it would seem that mobile ad hoc networks could 
easily be adapted to include a cooperative network within them to further enhance their 
capabilities [3, 6]. 
2.5 – Advanced Encryption Standard 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is an encryption technique that has a fixed block 
size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits that controls the number of rounds of 
encryption. The AES cipher is created from a number of repetitions of transformation rounds that 
convert the input plaintext into the final output of a ciphertext. Each round consists of several 
processing steps, including one that depends on the encryption key. A set of reverse rounds are 
applied to transform ciphertext back into the original plaintext using the same encryption key. 
AES was the first publicly accessible and open cipher approved by the National Security Agency 
for top secret information [7-8]. 
The avalanche effect is a potentially promising effect that seems to be built into most 
encryption techniques. Because most encryptions have several rounds of modulation, one bit of 
error will travel and replicate through every round in the decryption process causing massive 
failure. The reception of the final ciphertext bearing this small mistake would lead to roughly 
50% corruption from only one bit of error. The avalanche effect can be detrimental for the initial 
sender of the information and for the “mole” [9-10]. 
2.6 – Security Levels 
Security Levels as given by FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules are broken up into four levels, level 1 being the lowest and weakest in security while 
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level 4 is the highest with the strongest in security. Understanding these levels will help 
determine just how secure data is handled within this system [11]. 
TABLE 2.1 
SECURITY LEVELS 
 Seals Tamper 
Level 1 No No 
Level 2 Yes No 
Level 3 Yes+ Yes 
Level 4 Yes++ Yes* 
Seal: If that data is opened there will be some evidence 
+: Seal is more sensitive and will react to its environment 
++: Seal is even more sensitive and will react even more to its environment 
Tamper: If the seal is broken it will zero data 
*: Tamper will zero out more information other than data 
 
The different security level definitions have to be established. That way, it can be known 
how much the system‟s security level would potentially change to show an enhancement in 
security. Most security levels are based on modules; these modules have an aspect of the 
physical security requirements, which will be applied to a certain respect. Since the problem of 
intercepting data strips away the rest of the security criteria, it will only be based on a few 
aspects of the true security module. A seal is a way to detect a breach of data without proper 
authorization, and a tamper will instantly destroy the data in reaction to the seal violation. Since 
the data is being passively intercepted, it will be difficult for a true physical seal to send evidence 
back to the source while transmitting for a proper tamper effect to take place. However, each 
channel will monitor signal strength. Monitoring changes in signal strength could be seen as a 
type of seal as it will give evidence that someone may be listening to the channel. The tampering 
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will still be in effect if such data is opened, but the “mole” will receive little to no useful 
information from a packet if it is split up, therefore any data will not be of use. Table-1 shows 
and describes the four levels that will help show how the proposed models will enhance the 
security level. [11] 
2.7 – State of the Art 
Currently there are several ways that network security works in order to keep intruders 
and attackers out of these security systems to protect important data. The state of the art for 
security includes how to deal with different types of attacks or applying trust aspects into a 
system or using different ways to route data.  However as will be seen these systems all focus on 
keeping intruders out only, never dealing with a spy or mole that can easily bypass all of these 
security measures because they are already within the system and never seen as a true threat. 
In Fantacci et al.‟s work, it was noted that wireless ad hoc networks are vulnerable to 
network layer attacks due to a lack of firewalls, which can be seen in many wired networks, by 
adding packet filtering techniques based on bloom filters they can adapt a firewall for wireless 
use [6]. In [12] Matalgah et al. work introduces a hybrid encryption technique between 
encryption and network coding. Xiaodong et al. investigation in wireless access in vehicular 
environments, they focused on protecting the user‟s privacy information that may be using a 
standardized system [13]. In Gkantsidis et al. uses a security scheme that handles attacks on the 
system [14]. Broukerche et al. looked into a wireless sensor networks with military application 
and investigated the types of attacks that can be made on them [15]. They also show how 
existing techniques can be used to prevent or impede those attacks for this network [15].   
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Makda et al.‟s work enhance and adapt current security schemes to help enforce end to 
end security in a cooperative system. Also determining if the rely point are trustworthy [16].Yan 
Sun et al. suggested adding trust into a distributed network, but by doing this it introduces trust 
related attacks [17]. This showed that trust can help in detecting malicious nodes and provide a 
better routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks [17]. Lu et al. shows cooperative security-
enforcement routing (CSER) protocol that intends to provide effective identification of 
misbehaviors on ad hoc routing, detection latency reduction and approximate location of the 
misbehaving node on a path [18]. With Jie Li et al. developed a robust and attack resistant trust 
management framework [19]. They displayed how their framework is better than existing ones 
against attacks [19]. In [20] Radosavac et al. focused on general widespread wireless network 
and developed a set of requirement for an intrusion detection system based on their defined 
security guarantees. Study‟s in accountability by Yang et al., which is the capability to trace an 
event even after it occurred proposes a few architectures; however this area has yet to mature 
[21].   
Chen et al. show an efficient key management system that can provide secured 
communication and routing with a small number of keys shared between the clusters used in the 
cooperative network [22]. Cerri et al. proposed an adaptive mechanism for routing that adds 
security to mobile ad hoc networks [23]. Roman et al., focuses on wireless sensor networks and 
have them adapt to intrusion by making nodes change in adverse situations using awareness 
mechanisms as a form of high level monitoring service [24]. In [25] Claveirole et al. enhanced 
wireless sensor networks and proposed three schemes to secure data aggregation that rely on 
multipath routing to help maintain end to end security [25].  
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2.8 – Summary 
The potential threat of a spy is very real and can be handled with a multi-node network 
by understanding the different security levels and how a good encryption technique assists with 
making a secure system. Many security systems focus on preventing and dealing with attacks, 
but a spy or a mole will never have to use a true attack thus making them all useless. Therefore, 
this is a problem in security for data transmission as it doesn‟t properly handle a spy or mole 
threat. This gives reason to investigating a way to handle such a threat allowing this work to 
continue.  
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CHAPTER 3  
SYSTEM MODEL 
3.1 – Introduction 
 In the first part of this chapter we discuss how the conventional single channel 
communication model (non-relay-based cooperative communication) is vulnerable to intruders 
who are obtaining information that is being transmitted. The rest of this chapter will present the 
proposed model that solves the issue of intrusion which prevents the spy or mole from obtaining 
all of the information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such a technique is 
suggested. We also define the signal and channel models to be used in this proposed topology. 
3.2 – Single Channel Communication Model 
 A block diagram demonstrating the single channel model for communicating encrypted 
data over the wireless channel is depicted in Figure 3.1. In this model, plaintext data is being 
encrypted with a highly secure encryption algorithm, such as the AES, with a secret key to create 
a ciphertext to be sent over a wireless channel after modulation. The channel is assumed to be 
ideal (i.e., no attenuation from fading) but it experiences an Additive White Gaussian Noise 
(AWGN). At the receiver side, the ciphertext is decrypted, after demodulation, with the same 
secret key, thus obtaining the original plaintext data at the destination.  
 Any data that is sent over a wireless channel is vulnerable to many types of attacks and 
interception because the wireless channel is an open medium that anyone can access, such as a 
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Wi-Fi hot spot. For example if the data is intercepted while being transmitted over the wireless 
channel, it would still appear to be secure because of the AES technique being used. This would 
mean that whoever intercepts the data does not have access to the key that was used in the 
encryption technique. As long as the key remains secure, then the data will stay secure even if it 
is intercepted. However, a spy or mole is assumed to have access to the secret key being used 
and if they can intercept the ciphertext then the data being sent is no longer secure. This is a 
serious flaw with the single channel model for sending secure data if a spy exists. In the 
following subsection, we propose solutions to this drawback.  
 
Figure 3.1 Single Channel Communication. 
3.3 – Proposed System Model 
 Since obtaining the complete ciphertext is important for the spy or mole to get the vital 
plaintext, breaking up the data and sending it over a relay-based cooperative network, as shown 
in Figure 3.2, would be an easy solution to this unseen threat. Breaking up the ciphertext data 
into different segments and transmitting each segment over a different path can lead to a more 
enhanced security due to the avalanche effect [9-10]. This aspect of using the avalanche effect is 
critical because it is what ensures that any corrupted or incomplete data is useless.  
13 
 
 
Figure 3.2 General Cooperative Network. 
Table 3.1 shows how a simple reorganization of data can lead to a mass miss 
understanding. Each character can be represented by an ASCII decimal number. ASCII is how 
we communicate our characters to ones and zeros a computer can understand.  So if we look at 
the “M” it can be represented with the decimal number “77” which the computer will understand 
in binary as “01001101”. The same process will continue for the rest of the table letters.  Now 
notice that each character is represent by eight binary numbers and having a word that is eight 
letters long allows this example to continue. So we now wish to send this information in eight 
different packets, instead of sending each character individually we can reorganize how this data 
is sent so that if it is intercepted it will not relate to what we are actually sending.  Now taking 
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each column and reading them from top to bottom we can get a new decimal number which will 
relate to a different character. This shows how a simple scramble can lead to a huge difference in 
what is sent and what the data actually is. If we apply this same concept to a ciphertext we will 
ensure that data being sent is not related to original data because it will force the avalanche effect 
to occur.  
TABLE 3.1 
Simple Scrambling of Data 
Char DEC 8
th
 7
th
 6
th
 5
th
 4
th
 3
rd
 2
nd
 1
st
 
M 77 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
o 111 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
h 104 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
a 97 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
m 109 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
m 109 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
a 97 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
d 100 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 
DEC 0 255 127 0 236 205 64 222 
 
Char NUL ÿ DEL NUL ì Í @ Þ 
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The following shows how the ciphertext will be broken up into smaller pieces because if 
it was done randomly the data couldn‟t be properly reassembled after transmission. Table 3.2 
shows several different methods that data could be broken up into over two paths for data 
transmission. Method 1 is to simply divide data according to the number of paths useable. 
Although the data is broken up with this method, because of the AES‟s fixed block size, any data 
that would be intercepted can be decrypted and the avalanche effect would not take place to help 
protect the information. So if we scramble or move bits within the ciphertext data, in such a way 
that the AES fixed block size data is affected, it would give reason for the avalanche effect to 
take place. Method 2 is based on space time division multiplexing with variable symbol size or 
grouping bits together with a symbol size or group of four to be divided among the different 
paths available which can be seen above how the grouping works. While Methods 3 and 4 are 
based on groups of two‟s and one‟s, respectively. Method 5 is to reverse the entire ciphertext and 
then apply Method-1 to it. Methods-6, 7, and 8 will start with reversing the entire ciphertext and 
then applying Methods 2, 3 and 4 to them respectively. When using the proposed break up 
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methods the longer the sequence of ones and zeros are the more codependent each packet 
becomes because each packet is a part of the original ciphertext. 
TABLE 3.2 
 SHADED AREA SHOWS WHAT BITS ARE BEING SELECTED, AND THE WHITE AREA SHOWS HOW THE 
PACKET WILL LOOK AFTER THE GROUPING IS COMPLETE 
BREAKUP OF CIPHER: 1111000011001010 
Method # Type Path 1 Path 2 
1 Split in half 11110000 11001010 
 Split 11110000 11001010 
2 By groups 4 11111100 00001010 
 Split 11110000 11001010 
3 By groups 2 11001110 11000010 
 Split 11110000 11001010 
4 By groups 1 11001011 11001000 
 Reverse split 01010011 00001111 
5 Reverse split 01010011 00001111 
 Reverse split 01010011 00001111 
6 By groups 4 01010000 00111111 
 Reverse split 01010011 00001111 
7 By groups 4 01000011 01110011 
 Reverse split 01010011 00001111 
8 By groups 4 00010011 11010011 
 
This model only handles the case if the spy or mole has only one location to obtain data 
from during data transmission. However, the spy or mole may have many sensors or may not be 
working alone in-order to listen to the data being sent. This means that intercepting data on 
multiple wireless channels will not be a problem for them. Since knowing if there is any problem 
on a link is important. There are many ways for this detection to be made such as, by allowing 
each node in this proposed network to monitor the power levels on a wireless channel, which 
will allow the network to know if there is a potential threat on a particular link. For example if 
the system detects threats on all three links that it is using, the system will add an additional link 
for transmission in-order to have at least one safe link. By knowing the power level, this 
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proposed network can always aim to use at least one additional wireless channel when there are 
known potential threats as seen in Figure 3.3. Thus, by adding or using an extra uncompromised 
link will ensure that the spy will never be able to obtain a 100% of the data that is being 
transmitted.  
 
Figure 3.3 N number of Relay points in a cooperative network. 
3.4 – Proposed System Model with Mobility 
 Taking the proposed model and giving each node the capability of movement will allow 
for a very adaptive network. In order for a mole or spy to access data that is being sent in an 
established transmission link they have to access the same spectrum or bandwidth of the wireless 
data link. By accessing the channel it will cause some interference which will lead to the power 
level of that link to change. If a link were to be considered compromised like in Figure 3.4a, a 
node could simply move and verify that there is no threat on the link anymore as shown in Figure 
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3.4b.  This would make things very difficult for a spy or mole to collect data not just from one 
link but all links. The spy would have to do far more work to be in many different locations at 
the same time.  If the spy is to pass a certain threshold for the amount of listening locations then 
this would give reason for an investigation of the power drops in the link while data is being 
transmitted, potentially leading to the spy being caught. 
 
Figure 3.4 Example of Mobility. 
3.5 – Channel Condition 
 In this work we will be using a binary phase shift keying (BPSK) for each simulated 
transmission. BPSK is where every “1” is given the positive voltage of the signal and every “0” 
is given the negative. Each channel will have its own additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) on 
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it. So the received signal will consist of the BPSK plus AWGN to be formed into its own 
ciphertext where the error analysis is a comparison of     and     on the bit level as given below. 
                        
                
       
          
                      
 
3.6 – Summary 
 As seen the proposed model eliminates the problem of the spy. The mole or spy will have 
to do far more work in order to obtain any useful information that is being transmitted. The 
proposed model gives several aspects of protection starting with detecting a threat on any 
particular link and making a note of it, breaking the data up into smaller pieces, which ensures 
that all the information is never in a single link, and finally scrambling the data such that if it is 
intercepted it will be unusable. With the proposed model in place and in effect it will enhance 
security against any kind of data interception including those that may have the key in order to 
read encrypted data. Analyzing and testing these aspects for protection will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4  
SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 – Introduction 
 This chapter covers building the simulation tool, which tests the proposed system model 
for proof of concept. The simulation is discussed in detail as well as how and why analysis is 
made. The results will show how the model compares to a standard system.  
4.2 – System Design and Testing Logic 
 The program is designed to create a random plaintext string that will be converted into 
ASCII decimal representation for each character or symbol in the string (see Appendix A). It will 
then be sent through sixteen numbers at a time to be encrypted (refer to Appendix B for MEX 
function and Creation process for a pre-coded AES algorithm written in C), because AES is a 
fixed 128 bit encryption so sixteen decimal numbers can be represented by 128 bits. Since AES 
can have 128, 192 or 256 bit keys, 128 bit key size will be assumed because it has the least 
number of rounds of encryption, and the key that is used will be considered constant because it is 
understood that the spy or mole will have access to the same key for reduction of runtime. After 
this is accomplished, it will be recombined into a single string to make a ciphertext for 
transmission.  
The program is designed to run through each break up method mentioned above for each 
single plaintext. Originally the program was supposed to handle over five million bits 
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(8!*128=5,160,960) for testing, which would act as an infinite data stream, but the encryption 
process alone to obtain the ciphertext was far too long. So the program was modified to just 
under twenty-five thousand (2*3*4*8*128=24,576). Once the ciphertext data is broken up into 
the two scrambled packets for transmission it is then modulated into ones for ones (1=1) and 
negative ones for zeros (-1=0). It is then expanded for two times such that the additive white 
Gaussian noise (AWGN) function in MATLAB could use the „measured‟ parameter for the 
power level of the incoming signal. This way each path will have its own noise conditions with 
the same signal to noise ratio in dB (SNR). 
                                        
                                                
                                                                 
                                          
                          
  
                                 
                                          
                          
                                              
  
 
The signal with noise was then checked and recreated into ones and zeros to form a 
received ciphertext for each path. It is then combined into one text at the receiver. As seen in the 
above algorithm. Each path was then checked with the original section that it corresponds with 
after decryption. Therefore data on path 1 would be compared to the first 50% of the plaintext 
data; this would be the reference point for comparison of error. This way the line is treated as if 
the mole were to only to receive path 1 or to only receive path 2. Each point on any line is from 
the average error after one hundred runs.  
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4.3 – Results 
 The following figures (4.1 to 4.8) show the probability for error as the SNR changes from 
-5dB to 15dB for each proposed break up method. The dark blue line is the theoretical curve with 
no encryption technique used. The green line represents the receiver point but has encryption and 
is a combination of the data that was sent over the different paths. While the red and teal lines 
show error of the individual paths for path 1 and path 2 respectively, also with encryption and 
represent what a data is available to be intercepted on that path alone. 
 
Figure 4.1 Method 1 break up over two paths for transmission. 
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Figure 4.2 Method 2 break up over two paths for transmission. 
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Figure 4.3 Method 3 break up over two paths for transmission. 
 
Figure 4.4 Method 4 break up over two paths for transmission. 
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Figure 4.5 Method 5 break up over two paths for transmission. 
 
Figure 4.6 Method 6 break up over two paths for transmission. 
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Figure 4.7 Method 7 break up over two paths for transmission. 
 
Figure 4.8 Method 8 break up over two paths for transmission. 
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4.4 – Analysis and Discussion 
 As seen in Figure 4.1 the lines representing at the receiver, and path one and path two 
follow the same trends, these lines only stop because error no longer exists. Meaning that 
although not all the data is present on path one or two the information that is collected is still 
readable because of the fixed 128 bit block size of the encryption technique in use. Therefore, 
Method 1 over two paths leads to half of the information being accessible to the spy or mole. 
 Now considering Figure 4.2, which uses Method 2, it can be seen that both paths one and 
two have a constant 50% probability bit error regardless of the SNR, this is because of the 
avalanche effect in the AES is being forced to occur. While observing the receiver, it shows that 
data is being accurately collected, unscrambled and decrypted when an acceptable SNR is 
reached. Therefore, as long as the breakup methods are modifying the bits under the fixed 128 bit 
block size of the AES algorithm, we force the avalanche effect to take place in decryption. 
Essentially, the model sends pieces of corrupted data over each path. This same observation can 
be made for Figure 4.3 through Figure 4.8 because Methods 3 through 8 scrambles the original 
ciphertext under the fixed 128 bit block size. 
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Figure 4.9 Percent of data available per path. 
 Figure 4.9 shows that as more paths become available for data transmission, the amounts 
of data in the packet will be reduced and then sent on each of the different paths making it more 
difficult for a mole to obtain useful data. Since there is a chance that more than one data link can 
be intercepted, this can lead to increased data collection by the mole. If the system will always 
keep at least one packet of data from being intercepted then regardless of how much data a mole 
may capture, it will never receive a 100% of the data being sent as seen in Figure 4.10. Thus, the 
mole may never achieve their goal.  
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Figure 4.10 Percent of data collected by spy. 
4.5 – Summary 
The detailed comprehensive simulation study is, presented in this chapter demonstrated 
the effectives of the proposed model in terms of error and how it can be useful to enhance 
security. This model can deal with the threat of a spy or mole by making it more difficult for 
them to amass all the information. The difficulty is that they will have to do more work to be in 
more than one location at a time, which will also increase their chances of being caught. 
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 Sending data directly using a single channel communication model, where there is a mole 
present that has the key and encryption technique is the same as sending data without any 
encryption. This can be seen as level 1 security since there is no way to properly seal the data 
there will be no protection for the data under a broken seal. We proposed a new technique to 
enhance the security of transmitted data. The data will be broken up over several paths to assure 
that a spy or a mole will never be able to get all the data transmitted. Looking at the proposed 
model where each link is monitored for changes in power level, which effectively seals the data 
in such a way that the system will know and potentially react to a broken seal. Since the data is 
always going to be broken up using any of the proposed Methods 2 through 8 that will act as an 
effective tamper. Therefore, if the intruder opens the data it will not make any sense, which 
makes the proposed model achieve level 3 security.  
 We conclude that the proposed model will always keep the spy or mole from collecting 
100% of the data transmitted. Although this system achieves a higher level of security there is 
not efficient information to know if there is a spy or a mole in the system. Since power drops in a 
system is an indication of the presence of moles this will lead to the increase of transmission 
channels and reception complexity as well as network management because the system will 
always have to be in effect using more resources to achieve the required security.  
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Future work may include having the relay nodes modify the data for multiple hop relays 
or having the nodes break the data up further into smaller data packets to be forwarded in the 
system. Also modifying the proposed system by applying the diversity combination techniques 
of a true cooperative network, which will intern create signal enhancement at the receiver.  
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APPENDIX A 
The following is the Matlab Code written to produce that majority of the graphs in this 
Thesis. The program begins by creating a random array for the plaintext in decimal ASCII 
numbers. Then the data is arranged in a matrix form in two dimensional array in order to be 
passed to the AES function in a proper manner taking 16 decimal number of plaintext at a time.  
Then the ciphertext that is collected is put back into a single dimension array, which gets broken 
up into two new arrays depending on the break up method that is being applied.  Each of the new 
arrays is created into a BPSK for transition where they will have an AWGN added that, depends 
on the SNR in dB applied to it.  The BPSK plus AWGN is then converted back to a ciphertext 
and then decrypted. The plaintext before encryption and the plaintext after decryption are 
compared; this gives the error for that single transition.  This process will be repeated to get an 
average % error. 
%Two Path Break Up 
%Mohammad Kishk 
  
clear all 
close all 
clc 
  
for Method=1:8 
    tic 
    rkey=128;%round key for 128,192, or 256 
    plaintext=char(randi([32 126],(2*3*4*8*16),1)'); 
     
    ascii=double(plaintext);%plaintext to ascii 
    asciibin0=dec2bin(ascii,8)-'0';%ascii dec array to ascii bin matrix 
  
    for i=1:max(size(asciibin0))/2 
        asciibin1(i,:)=asciibin0(i,:); 
        asciibin2(i,:)=asciibin0(i+(max(size(asciibin0))/2),:); 
    end 
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    blocknum=max(size(ascii))/16;%calculate the number 128 bit blocks for AES 
  
    asciiby16=(reshape(ascii,16,[]))';%breakup ascii into the 128 bit blocks 
  
    for i=1:blocknum 
        cipher(i,:)=AESEncrypt(rkey,asciiby16(i,:));%Encrypt using AES for 
each block 
    end 
     
    cipherbin=dec2bin(reshape(cipher',1,[]))-'0';%cipher dec array to cipher 
bin matrix 
    cipherstream=reshape(cipherbin',1,[]);%cipher stream of 1's and 0's 
     
    MAX=max(size(cipherstream));%calculated the max number of bits 
     
    %Break-up Methods to make packets of data for 2 paths 
    if Method==1 
        for i=1:MAX/2 
            path1(i)=cipherstream(i); 
            path2(i)=cipherstream(i+MAX/2); 
        end 
    elseif Method==2 
        for i=0:(MAX/8)-1 
            path1(1+4*i)=cipherstream(1+8*i); 
            path1(2+4*i)=cipherstream(2+8*i); 
            path1(3+4*i)=cipherstream(3+8*i); 
            path1(4+4*i)=cipherstream(4+8*i); 
            path2(1+4*i)=cipherstream(5+8*i); 
            path2(2+4*i)=cipherstream(6+8*i); 
            path2(3+4*i)=cipherstream(7+8*i); 
            path2(4+4*i)=cipherstream(8+8*i); 
        end 
    elseif Method==3 
        for i=0:(MAX/4)-1 
            path1(1+2*i)=cipherstream(1+4*i); 
            path1(2+2*i)=cipherstream(2+4*i); 
            path2(1+2*i)=cipherstream(3+4*i); 
            path2(2+2*i)=cipherstream(4+4*i); 
        end 
    elseif Method==4 
        for i=0:(MAX/2)-1 
            path1(1+i)=cipherstream(1+2*i); 
            path2(1+i)=cipherstream(2+2*i); 
        end 
    elseif Method==5 
        rcipherstream=fliplr(cipherstream);%cipher flip from left to right 
        for i=1:MAX/2 
            path1(i)=rcipherstream(i); 
            path2(i)=rcipherstream(i+MAX/2); 
        end 
    elseif Method==6 
        rcipherstream=fliplr(cipherstream);%cipher flip from left to right 
        for i=0:(MAX/8)-1 
            path1(1+4*i)=rcipherstream(1+8*i); 
            path1(2+4*i)=rcipherstream(2+8*i); 
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            path1(3+4*i)=rcipherstream(3+8*i); 
            path1(4+4*i)=rcipherstream(4+8*i); 
            path2(1+4*i)=rcipherstream(5+8*i); 
            path2(2+4*i)=rcipherstream(6+8*i); 
            path2(3+4*i)=rcipherstream(7+8*i); 
            path2(4+4*i)=rcipherstream(8+8*i); 
        end 
    elseif Method==7 
        rcipherstream=fliplr(cipherstream);%cipher flip from left to right 
        for i=0:(MAX/4)-1 
            path1(1+2*i)=rcipherstream(1+4*i); 
            path1(2+2*i)=rcipherstream(2+4*i); 
            path2(1+2*i)=rcipherstream(3+4*i); 
            path2(2+2*i)=rcipherstream(4+4*i); 
        end 
    elseif Method==8 
        rcipherstream=fliplr(cipherstream);%cipher flip from left to right 
        for i=0:(MAX/2)-1 
            path1(1+i)=rcipherstream(1+2*i); 
            path2(1+i)=rcipherstream(2+2*i); 
        end 
    end 
     
    bpskpath1=2*path1-1;%bpsk stream of 1's and -1's 
    bpskpath2=2*path2-1;%bpsk stream of 1's and -1's 
     
    step=2;%number of time steps each bit will take to transmit 
    for i=0:(max(size(bpskpath1))-1) 
        TXstream1(1+step*i)=bpskpath1(i+1); 
        TXstream1(2+step*i)=bpskpath1(i+1); 
        TXstream2(1+step*i)=bpskpath2(i+1); 
        TXstream2(2+step*i)=bpskpath2(i+1); 
    end 
     
    for dbcount=1:(21*3) 
        SNR(dbcount)=(dbcount/3)-6; 
        for count=1:100 
            %Add White Gaussian Noise 
            Noisestream1=awgn(TXstream1,SNR(dbcount),'measured'); 
            Noisestream2=awgn(TXstream2,SNR(dbcount),'measured'); 
         
            for i=0:(max(size(bpskpath2))-1) 
                %Check Averger and conver from (1's & -1's) ==> (1's & 0's) 
                checkavg1=(Noisestream1(1+step*i)+Noisestream1(2+step*i)); 
                if checkavg1>0 
                    RXstream1(1+i)=1; 
                else 
                    RXstream1(1+i)=0; 
                end 
                %Check Averger and conver from (1's & -1's) ==> (1's & 0's) 
                checkavg2=(Noisestream2(1+step*i)+Noisestream2(2+step*i)); 
                if checkavg2>0 
                    RXstream2(1+i)=1; 
                else 
                    RXstream2(1+i)=0; 
                end 
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            end 
             
            if Method==1 
                for i=1:(MAX/2) 
                    RXstream0(i)=RXstream1(i); 
                    RXstream0(i+MAX/2)=RXstream2(i); 
                end 
            elseif Method==2 
                for i=0:(MAX/8)-1 
                    RXstream0(1+8*i)=RXstream1(1+4*i); 
                    RXstream0(2+8*i)=RXstream1(2+4*i); 
                    RXstream0(3+8*i)=RXstream1(3+4*i); 
                    RXstream0(4+8*i)=RXstream1(4+4*i); 
                    RXstream0(5+8*i)=RXstream2(1+4*i); 
                    RXstream0(6+8*i)=RXstream2(2+4*i); 
                    RXstream0(7+8*i)=RXstream2(3+4*i); 
                    RXstream0(8+8*i)=RXstream2(4+4*i); 
                end 
            elseif Method==3 
                for i=0:(MAX/4)-1 
                    RXstream0(1+4*i)=RXstream1(1+2*i); 
                    RXstream0(2+4*i)=RXstream1(2+2*i); 
                    RXstream0(3+4*i)=RXstream2(1+2*i); 
                    RXstream0(4+4*i)=RXstream2(2+2*i); 
                end 
            elseif Method==4 
                for i=0:(MAX/2)-1 
                    RXstream0(1+2*i)=RXstream1(1+i); 
                    RXstream0(2+2*i)=RXstream2(1+i); 
                end 
            elseif Method==5 
                for i=1:(MAX/2) 
                    rRXstream0(i)=RXstream1(i); 
                    rRXstream0(i+MAX/2)=RXstream2(i); 
                end 
                RXstream0=fliplr(rRXstream0);%cipher flip from left to right 
            elseif Method==6 
                for i=0:(MAX/8)-1 
                    rRXstream0(1+8*i)=RXstream1(1+4*i); 
                    rRXstream0(2+8*i)=RXstream1(2+4*i); 
                    rRXstream0(3+8*i)=RXstream1(3+4*i); 
                    rRXstream0(4+8*i)=RXstream1(4+4*i); 
                    rRXstream0(5+8*i)=RXstream2(1+4*i); 
                    rRXstream0(6+8*i)=RXstream2(2+4*i); 
                    rRXstream0(7+8*i)=RXstream2(3+4*i); 
                    rRXstream0(8+8*i)=RXstream2(4+4*i); 
                end 
                RXstream0=fliplr(rRXstream0);%cipher flip from left to right 
            elseif Method==7 
                for i=0:(MAX/4)-1 
                    rRXstream0(1+4*i)=RXstream1(1+2*i); 
                    rRXstream0(2+4*i)=RXstream1(2+2*i); 
                    rRXstream0(3+4*i)=RXstream2(1+2*i); 
                    rRXstream0(4+4*i)=RXstream2(2+2*i); 
                end 
                RXstream0=fliplr(rRXstream0);%cipher flip from left to right 
            elseif Method==8 
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                for i=0:(MAX/2)-1 
                    rRXstream0(1+2*i)=RXstream1(1+i); 
                    rRXstream0(2+2*i)=RXstream2(1+i); 
                end 
                RXstream0=fliplr(rRXstream0);%cipher flip from left to right 
            end 
     
            RXbinary0=reshape(RXstream0,8,[])'; 
            RXbinary1=reshape(RXstream1,8,[])'; 
            RXbinary2=reshape(RXstream2,8,[])'; 
             
            RXcipher0by16=reshape(((bin2dec(num2str(RXbinary0)))'),16,[])'; 
            RXcipher1by16=reshape(((bin2dec(num2str(RXbinary1)))'),16,[])'; 
            RXcipher2by16=reshape(((bin2dec(num2str(RXbinary2)))'),16,[])'; 
     
            for i=1:max(size(RXcipher0by16)) 
                RXascii0(i,:)=AESDecrypt(rkey,RXcipher0by16(i,:)); 
            end 
         
            for i=1:max(size(RXcipher1by16)) 
                RXascii1(i,:)=AESDecrypt(rkey,RXcipher1by16(i,:)); 
                RXascii2(i,:)=AESDecrypt(rkey,RXcipher2by16(i,:)); 
            end 
     
            RX0=dec2bin(reshape(RXascii0',1,[]),8)-'0'; 
            RX1=dec2bin(reshape(RXascii1',1,[]),8)-'0'; 
            RX2=dec2bin(reshape(RXascii2',1,[]),8)-'0'; 
     
            binarycompare0=(asciibin0~=RX0); 
            binarycompare1=(asciibin1~=RX1); 
            binarycompare2=(asciibin2~=RX2); 
     
            
error0=max(size(find(binarycompare0)))*min(size(find(binarycompare0))); 
            
error1=max(size(find(binarycompare1)))*min(size(find(binarycompare1))); 
            
error2=max(size(find(binarycompare2)))*min(size(find(binarycompare2))); 
     
            total0=max(size(binarycompare0))*min(size(binarycompare0)); 
            total1=max(size(binarycompare1))*min(size(binarycompare1)); 
            total2=max(size(binarycompare2))*min(size(binarycompare2)); 
     
            perror0(count)=(error0/total0); 
            perror1(count)=(error1/total1); 
            perror2(count)=(error2/total2); 
        end 
         
        Pberror0(Method,dbcount)=mean(perror0); 
        Pberror1(Method,dbcount)=mean(perror1); 
        Pberror2(Method,dbcount)=mean(perror2); 
        theoryBer(Method,dbcount)= 0.5*erfc(sqrt(10.^(SNR(dbcount)/10))); % 
    end 
    toc 
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    figure(Method);  semilogy(SNR,theoryBer(Method,:),'b','linewidth',2) 
    hold on;    semilogy(SNR,Pberror0(Method,:),'g:','linewidth',4) 
    hold on;    semilogy(SNR,Pberror1(Method,:),'r-*','linewidth',3) 
    hold on;    semilogy(SNR,Pberror2(Method,:),'c--','linewidth',2) 
        title(['Bits=' num2str(total0) ' Runs=' num2str(count) ' Method=' 
num2str(Method)],'fontsize',12,'fontname','times new roman'); 
        ylabel('Probabitity Bit Error','fontsize',12,'fontname','times new 
roman') 
        xlabel('SNR(dB)','fontsize',12,'fontname','times new roman') 
        legend('Theory','At RX','Path1','Path2',3) 
        xlim([-5 15]) 
        ylim([10^-5 10^0]) 
        grid on; 
end 
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APPENDIX B 
 The following is a MEX-Function for Matlab in order to use a pre-coded AES in C as a 
function for Matlab to call. Several things were added to the original code in C and a few things 
are modified for the final code to work properly with Matlab functionality. Starting with the 
#include of the matrix.h and mex.h files and then define the rows, columns, and elements for the 
output of this function back to Matlab. The most important part was adding the void 
mexFunction, because this is what pulls in the values from Matlab and formats it to what C can 
understand. It also returns back the data of the C program back into the correct memory location 
and format so that when matlab calls on that data it can handle the data correctly. The following 
is the MEX function for AES encryption. 
/* 
****************************************************************** 
**       Advanced Encryption Standard implementation in C.     ** 
**       By Niyaz PK                                            ** 
**       E-mail: niyazlife@gmail.com                            ** 
**       Downloaded from Website: www.hoozi.com                 ** 
****************************************************************** 
This is the source code for encryption using the latest AES algorithm. 
AES algorithm is also called Rijndael algorithm. AES algorithm is  
recommended for non-classified by the National Institute of Standards  
and Technology(NIST), USA. Now-a-days AES is being used for almost  
all encryption applications all around the world. 
  
THE MAIN FEATURE OF THIS AES ENCRYPTION PROGRAM IS NOT EFFICIENCY; IT 
IS SIMPLICITY AND READABILITY. THIS SOURCE CODE IS PROVIDED FOR ALL 
TO UNDERSTAND THE AES ALGORITHM. 
  
Comments are provided as needed to understand the program. But the  
user must read some AES documentation to understand the underlying  
theory correctly. 
  
It is not possible to describe the complete AES algorithm in detail  
here. For the complete description of the algorithm, point your  
browser to: 
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http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf 
Find the Wikipedia page of AES at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard 
****************************************************************** 
*/ 
  
// Include stdio.h for standard input/output. 
// Used for giving output to the screen. 
#include<stdio.h> 
#include "matrix.h" 
  
#include "mex.h" 
  
#define ROWS 1 
#define COLUMNS 16 
#define ELEMENTS 16 
  
// The number of columns comprising a state in AES. This is a constant in 
AES. Value=4 
#define Nb 4 
  
// The number of rounds in AES Cipher. It is simply initiated to zero. The 
actual value is recieved in the program. 
int Nr=0; 
  
// The number of 32 bit words in the key. It is simply initiated to zero. The 
actual value is recieved in the program. 
int Nk=0; 
  
// in - it is the array that holds the plaintext to be encrypted. 
// out - it is the array that holds the key for encryption. 
// state - the array that holds the intermediate results during encryption. 
unsigned char in[16], out[16], state[4][4]; 
  
// The array that stores the round keys. 
unsigned char RoundKey[240]; 
  
// The Key input to the AES Program 
unsigned char Key[32]; 
  
int getSBoxValue(int num) 
{ 
    int sbox[256] =   { 
    //0     1    2      3     4    5     6     7      8    9     A      B    
C     D     E     F 
    0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 
0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, //0 
    0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 
0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, //1 
    0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 
0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, //2 
    0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 
0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, //3 
    0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 
0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, //4 
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    0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 
0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, //5 
    0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 
0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, //6 
    0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 
0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, //7 
    0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 
0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73, //8 
    0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 
0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, //9 
    0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 
0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, //A 
    0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 
0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, //B 
    0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 
0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, //C 
    0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 
0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, //D 
    0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 
0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, //E 
    0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 
0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 }; //F 
    return sbox[num]; 
} 
  
// The round constant word array, Rcon[i], contains the values given by  
// x to th e power (i-1) being powers of x (x is denoted as {02}) in the 
field GF(28) 
// Note that i starts at 1, not 0). 
int Rcon[255] = { 
    0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 
0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a,  
    0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 
0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39,  
    0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 
0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a,  
    0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 
0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8,  
    0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 
0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef,  
    0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 
0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc,  
    0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 
0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b,  
    0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 
0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3,  
    0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 
0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94,  
    0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 
0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20,  
    0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 
0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35,  
    0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 
0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f,  
    0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 
0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04,  
48 
 
    0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 
0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63,  
    0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 
0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd,  
    0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 50x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 
0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb  }; 
  
// This function produces Nb(Nr+1) round keys. The round keys are used in 
each round to encrypt the states.  
void KeyExpansion() 
{ 
    int i,j; 
    unsigned char temp[4],k; 
     
    // The first round key is the key itself. 
    for(i=0;i<Nk;i++) 
    { 
        RoundKey[i*4]=Key[i*4]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+1]=Key[i*4+1]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+2]=Key[i*4+2]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+3]=Key[i*4+3]; 
    } 
  
    // All other round keys are found from the previous round keys. 
    while (i < (Nb * (Nr+1))) 
    { 
                    for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
                    { 
                        temp[j]=RoundKey[(i-1) * 4 + j]; 
                    } 
                    if (i % Nk == 0) 
                    { 
                        // This function rotates the 4 bytes in a word to the 
left once. 
                        // [a0,a1,a2,a3] becomes [a1,a2,a3,a0] 
  
                        // Function RotWord() 
                        { 
                            k = temp[0]; 
                            temp[0] = temp[1]; 
                            temp[1] = temp[2]; 
                            temp[2] = temp[3]; 
                            temp[3] = k; 
                        } 
  
                        // SubWord() is a function that takes a four-byte 
input word and  
                        // applies the S-box to each of the four bytes to 
produce an output word. 
  
                        // Function Subword() 
                        { 
                            temp[0]=getSBoxValue(temp[0]); 
                            temp[1]=getSBoxValue(temp[1]); 
                            temp[2]=getSBoxValue(temp[2]); 
                            temp[3]=getSBoxValue(temp[3]); 
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                        } 
  
                        temp[0] =  temp[0] ^ Rcon[i/Nk]; 
                    } 
                    else if (Nk > 6 && i % Nk == 4) 
                    { 
                        // Function Subword() 
                        { 
                            temp[0]=getSBoxValue(temp[0]); 
                            temp[1]=getSBoxValue(temp[1]); 
                            temp[2]=getSBoxValue(temp[2]); 
                            temp[3]=getSBoxValue(temp[3]); 
                        } 
                    } 
                    RoundKey[i*4+0] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+0] ^ temp[0]; 
                    RoundKey[i*4+1] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+1] ^ temp[1]; 
                    RoundKey[i*4+2] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+2] ^ temp[2]; 
                    RoundKey[i*4+3] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+3] ^ temp[3]; 
                    i++; 
    } 
} 
  
// This function adds the round key to state. 
// The round key is added to the state by an XOR function. 
void AddRoundKey(int round)  
{ 
    int i,j; 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            state[j][i] ^= RoundKey[round * Nb * 4 + i * Nb + j]; 
        } 
    } 
} 
  
// The SubBytes Function Substitutes the values in the 
// state matrix with values in an S-box. 
void SubBytes() 
{ 
    int i,j; 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            state[i][j] = getSBoxValue(state[i][j]); 
  
        } 
    } 
} 
  
// The ShiftRows() function shifts the rows in the state to the left. 
// Each row is shifted with different offset. 
// Offset = Row number. So the first row is not shifted. 
void ShiftRows() 
{ 
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    unsigned char temp; 
  
    // Rotate first row 1 columns to left    
    temp=state[1][0]; 
    state[1][0]=state[1][1]; 
    state[1][1]=state[1][2]; 
    state[1][2]=state[1][3]; 
    state[1][3]=temp; 
  
    // Rotate second row 2 columns to left   
    temp=state[2][0]; 
    state[2][0]=state[2][2]; 
    state[2][2]=temp; 
  
    temp=state[2][1]; 
    state[2][1]=state[2][3]; 
    state[2][3]=temp; 
  
    // Rotate third row 3 columns to left 
    temp=state[3][0]; 
    state[3][0]=state[3][3]; 
    state[3][3]=state[3][2]; 
    state[3][2]=state[3][1]; 
    state[3][1]=temp; 
} 
  
// xtime is a macro that finds the product of {02} and the argument to xtime 
modulo {1b}   
#define xtime(x)   ((x<<1) ^ (((x>>7) & 1) * 0x1b)) 
  
// MixColumns function mixes the columns of the state matrix 
void MixColumns() 
{ 
    int i; 
    unsigned char Tmp,Tm,t; 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    {    
        t=state[0][i]; 
        Tmp = state[0][i] ^ state[1][i] ^ state[2][i] ^ state[3][i] ; 
        Tm = state[0][i] ^ state[1][i] ; Tm = xtime(Tm); state[0][i] ^= Tm ^ 
Tmp ; 
        Tm = state[1][i] ^ state[2][i] ; Tm = xtime(Tm); state[1][i] ^= Tm ^ 
Tmp ; 
        Tm = state[2][i] ^ state[3][i] ; Tm = xtime(Tm); state[2][i] ^= Tm ^ 
Tmp ; 
        Tm = state[3][i] ^ t ; Tm = xtime(Tm); state[3][i] ^= Tm ^ Tmp ; 
    } 
} 
  
// Cipher is the main function that encrypts the PlainText. 
void Cipher() 
{ 
    int i,j,round=0; 
  
    //Copy the input PlainText to state array. 
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    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            state[j][i] = in[i*4 + j]; 
        } 
    } 
  
    // Add the First round key to the state before starting the rounds. 
    AddRoundKey(0);  
     
    // There will be Nr rounds. 
    // The first Nr-1 rounds are identical. 
    // These Nr-1 rounds are executed in the loop below. 
    for(round=1;round<Nr;round++) 
    { 
        SubBytes(); 
        ShiftRows(); 
        MixColumns(); 
        AddRoundKey(round); 
    } 
     
    // The last round is given below. 
    // The MixColumns function is not here in the last round. 
    SubBytes(); 
    ShiftRows(); 
    AddRoundKey(Nr); 
  
    // The encryption process is over. 
    // Copy the state array to output array. 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            out[i*4+j]=state[j][i]; 
        } 
    } 
} 
void AESEncrypt() 
{ 
    int i; 
    unsigned char temp[32] = {0x00  ,0x01  ,0x02  ,0x03  ,0x04  ,0x05  ,0x06  
,0x07  ,0x08  ,0x09  ,0x0a  ,0x0b  ,0x0c  ,0x0d  ,0x0e  ,0x0f}; 
  
    // Calculate Nk and Nr from the recieved value. 
    Nk = Nr / 32; 
    Nr = Nk + 6; 
  
    for(i=0;i<Nk*4;i++) 
    { 
        Key[i]=temp[i]; 
    } 
  
    // The KeyExpansion routine must be called before encryption. 
    KeyExpansion(); 
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    // The next function call encrypts the PlainText with the Key using AES 
algorithm. 
    Cipher(); 
} 
  
void mexFunction(int nlhs, mxArray *plhs[], int nrhs, const mxArray *prhs[]) 
{ 
    int i; 
    double *roundPt,*inPt; 
    double *dynamicData; 
    
    mwSize index; 
    
    roundPt=mxGetPr(prhs[0]); 
    Nr= (int)(*roundPt); 
    
    inPt=mxGetPr(prhs[1]);//points to the start of where the data is 
    //fill global var. in 
    for(i=0;i<16;i++) 
    { 
        in[i]=inPt[i]; 
    } 
    
    AESEncrypt(); 
    
    dynamicData = (double*) mxMalloc(ELEMENTS * sizeof(double)); 
    for ( index = 0; index < ELEMENTS; index++ ) { 
        dynamicData[index] = out[index]; 
    } 
    
    /* Create a 0-by-0 mxArray; you will allocate the memory dynamically */ 
    plhs[0] = mxCreateNumericMatrix(0, 0, mxDOUBLE_CLASS, mxREAL); 
  
    /* Put the C array into the mxArray and define its dimensions */ 
    mxSetPr(plhs[0], dynamicData); 
    mxSetM(plhs[0], ROWS); 
    mxSetN(plhs[0], COLUMNS); 
    
    return; 
} 
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APPENDIX C 
The following is the MEX functions for AES decryption refer to Appendix-B. 
/* 
****************************************************************** 
**       Advanced Encryption Standard implementation in C.     ** 
**       By Niyaz PK                                            ** 
**       E-mail: niyazlife@gmail.com                            ** 
**       Downloaded from Website: www.hoozi.com                 ** 
****************************************************************** 
This is the source code for decryption using the latest AES algorithm. 
AES algorithm is also called Rijndael algorithm. AES algorithm is 
recommended for non-classified use by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology(NIST), USA. Now-a-days AES is being used for almost 
all encryption applications all around the world. 
  
THE MAIN FEATURE OF THIS AES ENCRYPTION PROGRAM IS NOT EFFICIENCY; IT 
IS SIMPLICITY AND READABILITY. THIS SOURCE CODE IS PROVIDED FOR ALL 
TO UNDERSTAND THE AES ALGORITHM. 
  
Comments are provided as needed to understand the program. But the 
user must read some AES documentation to understand the underlying 
theory correctly. 
  
It is not possible to describe the complete AES algorithm in detail 
here. For the complete description of the algorithm, point your 
browser to: 
http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf 
Find the Wikipedia page of AES at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard 
****************************************************************** 
*/ 
  
// Include stdio.h for standard input/output. 
// Used for giving output to the screen. 
#include<stdio.h> 
#include "matrix.h" 
  
#include "mex.h" 
  
#define ROWS 1 
#define COLUMNS 16 
#define ELEMENTS 16 
 
// The number of columns comprising a state in AES. This is a constant in 
AES. Value=4 
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#define Nb 4 
  
// The number of rounds in AES Cipher. It is simply initiated to zero. The 
actual value is recieved in the program. 
int Nr=0; 
  
// The number of 32 bit words in the key. It is simply initiated to zero. The 
actual value is recieved in the program. 
int Nk=0; 
  
// in - it is the array that holds the CipherText to be decrypted. 
// out - it is the array that holds the output of the for decryption. 
// state - the array that holds the intermediate results during decryption. 
unsigned char in[16], out[16], state[4][4]; 
  
// The array that stores the round keys. 
unsigned char RoundKey[240]; 
  
// The Key input to the AES Program 
unsigned char Key[32]; 
  
int getSBoxInvert(int num) 
{ 
int rsbox[256] = 
{ 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38, 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 
0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb 
, 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 
0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb 
, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 
0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e 
, 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 
0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 
, 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 
0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 
, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 
0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 
, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 
0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 
, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 
0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b 
, 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 
0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 
, 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 
0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e 
, 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 
0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b 
, 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 
0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 
, 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 
0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f 
, 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 
0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef 
, 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 
0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 
, 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26, 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 
0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d }; 
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return rsbox[num]; 
} 
  
int getSBoxValue(int num) 
{ 
    int sbox[256] =   { 
    //0     1    2      3     4    5     6     7      8    9     A      B    
C     D     E     F 
    0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 
0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 
    0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 
0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 
    0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 
0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 
    0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 
0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 
    0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 
0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 
    0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 
0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 
    0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 
0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 
    0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 
0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 
    0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 
0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73, 
    0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 
0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 
    0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 
0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 
    0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 
0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 
    0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 
0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 
    0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 
0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 
    0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 
0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 
    0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 
0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 }; 
    return sbox[num]; 
} 
  
// The round constant word array, Rcon[i], contains the values given by 
// x to th e power (i-1) being powers of x (x is denoted as {02}) in the 
field GF(2^8) 
// Note that i starts at 1, not 0). 
int Rcon[255] = { 
    0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 
0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 
    0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 
0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 
    0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 
0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 
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    0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 
0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 
    0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 
0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 
    0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 
0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 
    0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 
0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 
    0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 
0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 
    0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 
0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 
    0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 
0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 
    0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 
0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 
    0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 
0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 
    0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 
0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 
    0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 
0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 
    0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 
0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 
    0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 
0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb  }; 
  
// This function produces Nb(Nr+1) round keys. The round keys are used in 
each round to decrypt the states. 
void KeyExpansion() 
{ 
    int i,j; 
    unsigned char temp[4],k; 
    
    // The first round key is the key itself. 
    for(i=0;i<Nk;i++) 
    { 
        RoundKey[i*4]=Key[i*4]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+1]=Key[i*4+1]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+2]=Key[i*4+2]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+3]=Key[i*4+3]; 
    } 
  
    // All other round keys are found from the previous round keys. 
    while (i < (Nb * (Nr+1))) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            temp[j]=RoundKey[(i-1) * 4 + j]; 
        } 
        if (i % Nk == 0) 
        { 
            // This function rotates the 4 bytes in a word to the left once. 
            // [a0,a1,a2,a3] becomes [a1,a2,a3,a0] 
  
            // Function RotWord() 
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            { 
                k = temp[0]; 
                temp[0] = temp[1]; 
                temp[1] = temp[2]; 
                temp[2] = temp[3]; 
                temp[3] = k; 
            } 
  
            // SubWord() is a function that takes a four-byte input word and 
            // applies the S-box to each of the four bytes to produce an 
output word. 
  
            // Function Subword() 
            { 
                temp[0]=getSBoxValue(temp[0]); 
                temp[1]=getSBoxValue(temp[1]); 
                temp[2]=getSBoxValue(temp[2]); 
                temp[3]=getSBoxValue(temp[3]); 
            } 
  
            temp[0] =  temp[0] ^ Rcon[i/Nk]; 
        } 
        else if (Nk > 6 && i % Nk == 4) 
        { 
            // Function Subword() 
            { 
                temp[0]=getSBoxValue(temp[0]); 
                temp[1]=getSBoxValue(temp[1]); 
                temp[2]=getSBoxValue(temp[2]); 
                temp[3]=getSBoxValue(temp[3]); 
            } 
        } 
        RoundKey[i*4+0] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+0] ^ temp[0]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+1] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+1] ^ temp[1]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+2] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+2] ^ temp[2]; 
        RoundKey[i*4+3] = RoundKey[(i-Nk)*4+3] ^ temp[3]; 
        i++; 
    } 
} 
  
// This function adds the round key to state. 
// The round key is added to the state by an XOR function. 
void AddRoundKey(int round) 
{ 
    int i,j; 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            state[j][i] ^= RoundKey[round * Nb * 4 + i * Nb + j]; 
        } 
    } 
} 
  
// The SubBytes Function Substitutes the values in the 
// state matrix with values in an S-box. 
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void InvSubBytes() 
{ 
    int i,j; 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            state[i][j] = getSBoxInvert(state[i][j]); 
  
        } 
    } 
} 
  
// The ShiftRows() function shifts the rows in the state to the left. 
// Each row is shifted with different offset. 
// Offset = Row number. So the first row is not shifted. 
void InvShiftRows() 
{ 
    unsigned char temp; 
  
    // Rotate first row 1 columns to right    
    temp=state[1][3]; 
    state[1][3]=state[1][2]; 
    state[1][2]=state[1][1]; 
    state[1][1]=state[1][0]; 
    state[1][0]=temp; 
  
    // Rotate second row 2 columns to right    
    temp=state[2][0]; 
    state[2][0]=state[2][2]; 
    state[2][2]=temp; 
  
    temp=state[2][1]; 
    state[2][1]=state[2][3]; 
    state[2][3]=temp; 
  
    // Rotate third row 3 columns to right 
    temp=state[3][0]; 
    state[3][0]=state[3][1]; 
    state[3][1]=state[3][2]; 
    state[3][2]=state[3][3]; 
    state[3][3]=temp; 
} 
  
// xtime is a macro that finds the product of {02} and the argument to xtime 
modulo {1b}  
#define xtime(x)   ((x<<1) ^ (((x>>7) & 1) * 0x1b)) 
  
// Multiplty is a macro used to multiply numbers in the field GF(2^8) 
#define Multiply(x,y) (((y & 1) * x) ^ ((y>>1 & 1) * xtime(x)) ^ ((y>>2 & 1) 
* xtime(xtime(x))) ^ ((y>>3 & 1) * xtime(xtime(xtime(x)))) ^ ((y>>4 & 1) * 
xtime(xtime(xtime(xtime(x)))))) 
  
// MixColumns function mixes the columns of the state matrix. 
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// The method used to multiply may be difficult to understand for the 
inexperienced. 
// Please use the references to gain more information. 
void InvMixColumns() 
{ 
    int i; 
    unsigned char a,b,c,d; 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    {    
    
        a = state[0][i]; 
        b = state[1][i]; 
        c = state[2][i]; 
        d = state[3][i]; 
  
        
        state[0][i] = Multiply(a, 0x0e) ^ Multiply(b, 0x0b) ^ Multiply(c, 
0x0d) ^ Multiply(d, 0x09); 
        state[1][i] = Multiply(a, 0x09) ^ Multiply(b, 0x0e) ^ Multiply(c, 
0x0b) ^ Multiply(d, 0x0d); 
        state[2][i] = Multiply(a, 0x0d) ^ Multiply(b, 0x09) ^ Multiply(c, 
0x0e) ^ Multiply(d, 0x0b); 
        state[3][i] = Multiply(a, 0x0b) ^ Multiply(b, 0x0d) ^ Multiply(c, 
0x09) ^ Multiply(d, 0x0e); 
    } 
} 
  
// InvCipher is the main function that decrypts the CipherText. 
void InvCipher() 
{ 
    int i,j,round=0; 
  
    //Copy the input CipherText to state array. 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            state[j][i] = in[i*4 + j]; 
        } 
    } 
  
    // Add the First round key to the state before starting the rounds. 
    AddRoundKey(Nr); 
  
    // There will be Nr rounds. 
    // The first Nr-1 rounds are identical. 
    // These Nr-1 rounds are executed in the loop below. 
    for(round=Nr-1;round>0;round--) 
    { 
        InvShiftRows(); 
        InvSubBytes(); 
        AddRoundKey(round); 
        InvMixColumns(); 
    } 
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    // The last round is given below. 
    // The MixColumns function is not here in the last round. 
    InvShiftRows(); 
    InvSubBytes(); 
    AddRoundKey(0); 
  
    // The decryption process is over. 
    // Copy the state array to output array. 
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) 
    { 
        for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
        { 
            out[i*4+j]=state[j][i]; 
        } 
    } 
} 
  
void AESDecrypt() 
{ 
    int i; 
    unsigned char temp[32] = {0x00  ,0x01  ,0x02  ,0x03  ,0x04  ,0x05  ,0x06  
,0x07  ,0x08  ,0x09  ,0x0a  ,0x0b  ,0x0c  ,0x0d  ,0x0e  ,0x0f}; 
  
    // Calculate Nk and Nr from the recieved value. 
    Nk = Nr / 32; 
    Nr = Nk + 6; 
  
    for(i=0;i<Nk*4;i++) 
    { 
        Key[i]= temp[i]; 
    } 
  
    //The Key-Expansion routine must be called before the decryption routine. 
    KeyExpansion(); 
  
    // The next function call decrypts the CipherText with the Key using AES 
algorithm. 
    InvCipher(); 
} 
  
void mexFunction(int nlhs, mxArray *plhs[], int nrhs, const mxArray *prhs[]) 
{ 
    int i; 
    double *roundPt,*inPt; 
    double *dynamicData; 
    
    mwSize index; 
    
    roundPt=mxGetPr(prhs[0]); 
    Nr= (int)(*roundPt); 
    
    inPt=mxGetPr(prhs[1]);//points to the start of where the data is 
    //fill global var. in 
    for(i=0;i<16;i++) 
    { 
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        in[i]=inPt[i]; 
    } 
    
    AESDecrypt(); 
    
    dynamicData = (double*) mxMalloc(ELEMENTS * sizeof(double)); 
    for ( index = 0; index < ELEMENTS; index++ ) { 
        dynamicData[index] = out[index]; 
    } 
    
    /* Create a 0-by-0 mxArray; you will allocate the memory dynamically */ 
    plhs[0] = mxCreateNumericMatrix(0, 0, mxDOUBLE_CLASS, mxREAL); 
  
    /* Put the C array into the mxArray and define its dimensions */ 
    mxSetPr(plhs[0], dynamicData); 
    mxSetM(plhs[0], ROWS); 
    mxSetN(plhs[0], COLUMNS); 
    
    return; 
} 
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